In this work we consider a model of epidemic spreading coupled with an opinion dynamics in a fully-connected population. Regarding the opinion dynamics, the individuals may be in two distinct states, namely in favor or against a vaccination campaign. Individuals against the vaccination follow a standard SIS model, whereas the pro-vaccine individuals can also be in a third compartment, namely Vaccinated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemic spreading and opinion formation are two dynamical processes that have been atracted the interest of the scientific community in the last years [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The interest of physicists varies from theoretical aspects like critical phenomena [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , stochasticity [14, 15] , universality [16] and multiple phase transitions [17] , to practical questions like the detection of the zero patient [18] , super spreaders [19] , effects of self isolation [20] and others. More recently, the coupling of epidemic and opinion modes have also been considered [21] [22] [23] [24] .
Regarding a vaccination campaign in a given population, the individuals consider some points in order to make the decision to take the vaccine or not. In the case when a considerable fraction of the population decides to does not take the vaccine, the consequences for the whole population may be drastic. As an example, in 2010 the French govenment requested vaccine for H1N1 for 90 million individuals, but about 6 million of the vaccines were effectively used by the population, and in this case the disease has spread fast [25] .
In this case, one can see that the public opinion can be a key feature in the diffusion of a disease in a given population, promoting the occurrence or the lack of an outbreak.
The public opinion about vaccination can be affected by economic factors. For example, we have a competition the "cost" to become vaccinated (collateral effects, required time to take the vaccine, ...) and the injury caused by the disease when the individual did not take the vaccine (medication, money, miss some days of work, ...). In this case, the usual approach is to consider game theory or epidemiological-economic models [26, 27] . However, usually the individuals/agents do not take into account only economic factors [21] [22] [23] [28] [29] [30] . As discussed in [31] , "if individuals are social followers, the resulting vaccination coverage would converge to a certain level, depending on individuals' initial level of vaccination willingness rather than the associated costs." In addition, in [32] it is discussed that "assumptions of economic rationality and payoff maximization are not mandatory for predicting commonly observed dynamics of vaccination coverage such as the failure to reach herd immunity and oscillations between high and low levels of coverage". Related to social norms, the authors in [33] propose that "including injunctive social norms will enable models of parental vaccinating behaviour for paediatric infectious diseases to better explain the whole range of observed vaccinating behaviour, including both vaccine refusal and the high vaccine coverage levels so commonly observed".
Indeed, some other works have shown that individuals are influenced by their social contacts in the process of opinion formation about a vaccination process [34, 35] . In this case, in this work we consider an opinion formation process coupled with an epidemic dynamics where vaccination is taking into account. Our target is to investigate how the density of Infected individuals in short and long times is affected by the social pressure and the engagement of the individuals regarding the vaccintaion. Thus, we are interested in answer some theoretical and practical questions:
1. What is the effect of social pressure and engagement in the epidemic spreading process?
2. What are the conditions for the occurrence of epidemic outbreaks in short times? 3. What is the critical initial density of pro-vaccine individuals that can avoid the occurrence of such short-time outbreaks?
4. The disease will survive in the long-time limit?
The answer for these questions are given in the next sections.
II. MODEL
An individual's willingness to vaccinate is derived from his perception of disease risk and vaccine safety. However, the interactions among individuals in small groups will also affect the decision of the individuals to take or not the vaccine. In this case, we will consider an epidemic dynamics coupled with an opinion dynamics regarding the vaccination. Thus, we consider a fully-connected population with N individuals or agents, that can be classified as follows:
• Opinion states: Pro-vaccine (opinion o = +1) or Anti-vaccine (opinion o = −1) individuals;
• Epidemic compartments: Susceptible (S), Infected (I) or Vaccinated (V) individuals; Each opinion is supported by a given fraction of the population, namely f +1 and f −1 , representing the fraction of Pro-vaccine and Anti-vaccine agents, respectively. As a simple modeling of the opinion dynamics, we considered that the opinion changes are ruled by the majority-rule dynamics [36, 37] , i.e., we choose at random a group of 3 agents. If there is a local majority (2 × 1) in favor of one of the two possible opinions, the individual with minority opinion will follow the local majority.
Regarding the epidemic dynamics, we made some assumptions [28] : (i) the opinion of an agent about the vaccination process determines his behavior regarding the decision to take the vaccine or not; (ii) at the same time the disease is introduced in the population, a mass vaccination campaign is started, but for simplification we did not consider competition for doses. Now, let us elaborate upon the coupling of the two distinct dynamics (opinion and epidemic). Figure 1 shows an esquematic representation of the dynamics. The Pro-vaccine agents (opinion o = +1) take the vaccine with probability γ. This parameter can be viewed as the engagement of the individuals regarding the vaccination campaign, i.e., it measures the tendency of an agent to go to the hospital to take a dose of the vaccine. Indeed, many times the individuals refuse to leave home to take a vaccine due to the time expended to conclude all the process. In this case, the complementary probability 1 − γ will represent this "laziness". In the case a given individual does not take the vaccine, he can become infected with probability λ if he make a contact with an Infected individual, as in a standard SIS model [38, 39] . In the same way, an Infected individual becomes Susceptible again with probability α. Considering the Vaccinated agents, we considered that the vaccine is not permanent, so a vaccinated agent becomes susceptible again with rate φ, the resusceptibility probability [40, 41] . Summarizing, the individuals with opinion o = +1 can undergo the following transitions among the epidemic compartments:
• S → V : each Susceptible and Pro-vaccine individual becomes Vaccinated with probability γ;
• S → I: each Susceptible and Pro-vaccine individual becomes Infected with probability (1 − γ)λ if he is in contact with an Infected agent.
On the other hand, the agents against the vaccination process do not take the vaccine.
In this case, they follow a standard SIS dynamics, with infection probability λ and recovery probability α [38, 39] . Finally, the common transitions among states for both agents (o = +1
and o = −1) are given by • I → S: each Infected individual recovers and becomes susceptible again with probability α;
• V → S: each Vaccinated individual becomes Susceptible again with the resusceptibility probability φ, since the vaccine wears off [40] .
As initial conditions, we considered a fraction D (1 − D) of individuals carrying the opinion o = +1 (o = −1) at t = 0. In addition, 1% of the individuals start the dynamics in the Infected state, and the remaining 99% in the Susceptible compartment. We considered synchronous update schemes for opinion and epidemic dynamics, i.e., both the transitions among the opinions and among the epidemic compartments are updated in a parallel way.
For each simulation time step, the algorithm is as follows:
• we choose at random N groups composed of 3 agents, and then we apply the majorityrule dynamics in each group;
• the opinions are updated using a parallel scheme;
• after the opinion dynamics, we visit every site in the fully-connected newtork in a sequential order;
• we apply the epidemic dynamics' rules to each agent;
• the epidemic states of the individuals are updated using a parallel scheme.
The mean-field equations for the model can be written as
where S, I and V are the fractions of Susceptibles, Infected and Vaccinated individuals, respectively. All the analytical calculations are performed in details in the A. In the following section we discuss the main analytical results and outcomes of our simulations.
III. RESULTS
After the definition of the model, one can start to answer the four questions formulated at the end of the Introduction. As we are considering a fully-connected network, we considered the above mean-field equations to analyze the system, Eqs. (1) - (3), with special attention to the stationary properties of the model. We also considered an agentbased modelling of the system, since the individuals (agents) are the primary subject in a social theory [42] . For this purpose, we considered populations with N = 10 4 agents, and for sake of simplicity, we fixed the recovery probability α = 0.2 in all simulations. Considering the stationary states of the model, all of our results are averaged over 100 independent simulations in order to obtain better statistics.
In the following we will consider separately the short-time and the long-time behavior of the system. We considered Eqs. (6) and (7) 
where R e is given by
Notice that the above expression depends on the initial fraction D of Pro-vaccine agents and on the engagement γ, and it does not depend on the resusceptibility probability φ. In other words, Eq. (5) In order to compare both expression for the effective reproductive number, one can rewrite Eq. (5) as
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To avoid an epidemic outbreak, R e ≤ 1, which implies that
). In this case, one can define a critical density D c as
Figure 2 exhibits a diagram that help us to answer the question (ii) pointed in the Introduction, as discussed in the following:
1. Red region (D c ≤ 0): in this region the solution (7) is mathematically valid but it presents no physical meaning. It indicates that the outbreak does not occur due to purely epidemic reasons, i.e., we have R Those last results answer the questions (ii) and (iii) made in the Introduction.
B. Long-time behavior
In this section we analyze the long-time behavior of the model, i.e., its steady-state properties. As we will see in the following, in opposition to what happend in the short-time case, the stationary behavior of the model depends on the resusceptibility probability φ. In this case, we will study separately the two cases φ = 0 and φ = 0.
Vaccination with limited efficiency (φ = 0)
For the case with temporary immunity φ = 0, one can obtain all the fractions of the epidemic states in the limit t → ∞ (see A). The stationary density of Vaccinated and Susceptible individuals are given, respectively, by
On the other hand, the stationary density of Infected individuals is given by 
where the epidemic thresholds for the cases D < 0.5 and D > 0.5 are, respectively,
Equations (11) and (12) show that effect of the social pressure is twofold. For D < 0.5, the social pressure has a negative effect, in a way that it eliminates from the threshold λ 
This value γ * is the engagement above which there is no endemic phase in the system.
In Figure 3 we exhibit some analytical and numerical results. In Figures 3 (a) and (b) we show typical results for the stationary density of Infected individuals I ∞ for D < 0.5 it is necessary more engagement in order to eliminate the disease propagation, which is also a realistic result of the model.
In Figure 4 we exhibit numerical results for D = 0.75, i.e., for an initial majority of agents supporting the vaccination process. In this case, the opinion dynamics leads the system to a steady state were all agents follow this initial majority. Even in this case, a small engagement of the individuals like γ = 0.1 is not sufficient to avoid an epidemic outbreak (R e = 2.64 > 1 and λ = 0.6 > λ c = 0.44), and in addition the disease survives in the population in the long-time limit. On the other hand, for γ = 0.5 we have a disease-free equilibrium after a long time, but the outbreak still occurs (R e = 1.78 > 1 and λ = 0.6 < λ c = 0.75). Finally, for a sufficient high engagement like γ = 0.9, the outbreak does not occurs (R e = 0.93 < 1 and λ = 0.6 < λ c = 20.0), the epidemic disappears in few time steps of the population, and
we have a disease-free equilibrium in the long-time limit. 
As one can see, for φ = 0 the above equations furnish only the exact solution for S ∞ , and a relation between I ∞ and V ∞ This is a consequence of the compartment V , that for φ = 0 is an absorbing state, i.e., if an agent enters in this compartment he will not change his epidemic state anymore. In this case, we will focus our study mainly in computer simulations. However, the above analytical results can give us some insights in the behavior of the model. First of all, Eq. (16) predicts a phase transition. On the other hand, one can see from Eq. (14)- (16) We exhibit in Figure 6 numerical results for the temporal evolution of the densities of This result occurs due to the high engagement of the population, γ = 0.9, i.e., even being a minority in all the evolution of the system the Provaccine individuals take the vaccine with a high probability, and the immunity is permanent.
In this case, even when these individuals change opinion due to the social pressure, they are already vaccinated. Finally, in the panel (c) of Figure 6 we show results for D = 0.3, i.e., the great majority of the population (70%) starts the dynamics against the vaccination process. In this case, one can see that the outbreak occurs (since R e > 1) and the disease survives in the stationary state. This occurs due to the rapid population consensus against the vaccination, and even for a high engagement the pro-vaccine agents disappear rapidly of the population due to
social pressure.
For better analyze the effect of social pressure in the epidemic spreading, we exhibit in (D > 0.5), the disease disappears of the population in the steady state, independent of the values of γ and λ, as predicted analytically in Eqs. (14)- (16) . This is a positive effect of the social pressure [33, 45, 46] . On the other hand, for small values of D (D <≈ 0.15) the density of Infected agents is independent of γ, for a fixed value of λ. In other words, if the the population is initially mainly dominated by individuals against the vaccination, the engagement has no effect on the disease propagation, and we have an endemic phase. In this case, the social pressure causes a negative effect on the disease spreading [33, 45, 46] .
However, one can see in Figure 7 an interesting result for the cases with D < 0.5: despite the mentioned negative effect of social pressure, a sufficient high engagement like γ = 0.9 can lead to the disease extinction in the stationary state, since the initial majority of antivaccine individuals is not much larger than the initial minority of pro-vaccince agents. This result can be observed in the three graphics of Figure 7 , and is more pronounced for the smaller values of the infection probability λ. These results can be seen as a kind of power of the minority in the long-time limit. All those results are realistic features of our model.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this work, we have studied a model of epidemic spreading coupled with an opinion dynamics. Such opinion dynamics simulates the competition of two distinct positions regarding a vaccination campaign: pro-vaccine x anti-vaccine individuals. This competition is represented in our model by the Galam's majority-rule dynamics [36, 37] . In addition, the epidemic dynamics is governed by a compartmental model with 3 classes: Susceptibles (S), Infected (I) and Vaccinated (V) individuals. Finally, we considered two distinct cases:
the vaccine can give temporary or permanent immunity to the individuals.
For both cases, one can describe the model at mean-field level through ordinary differential equations. First, we analyzed the short-time behavior of the model, and we found that it does not depend on the resusceptibility rate φ, the probability for which a vaccinated individual becomes susceptible again. We calculated the effective reproductive number R e , that is given by R e = (1 − γD) S o (λ/α). This expression shows that the occurrence or absence of an epidemic outbreak depends on the infection and recovery probabilities (λ and α, respectively), as usual, but it also depends on social parameters. The first one is the initial fraction D of pro-vaccine individuals, and the other one is the engagement γ of those individuals. Thus, the coupling of both dynamics (opinion and epidemic) affects directly the disease diffusion in the short time. Based on the expression for R e , we discussed the the threshold depends explicity on φ, and we found that for sufficient high engagement the disease can disappear of the population in the long time, even for high infection rates. We also derived an analytical expression for the threshold value γ * above which there is no endemic phase in the population.
For the cases where the immunity is permanent, we only derived a closed analytical expression for the stationary density of Susceptible agents S ∞ . The expression for I ∞ depends on V ∞ , and we can conclude from that expressions only that there is a phase transition as in the previous case, and that if the initial majority is formed by Pro-vaccine individuals (D > 0.5), the disease will disapear after a long time, since the vaccine induces a permanent immunization and more agents become in favor of the vaccination during the evolution of the system due to the social pressure (majority-rule dynamics). This is a positive effect of the social pressure. The remaining of the analysis for permanent immunization was done through Monte Carlo simulations. In this case, we also found distinct epidemic scenarios, with endemic and disease-free phases, and the occurrence or not of outbreaks. In addition, we verified that if there is initially an overwhelming majority of anti-vaccine agents (D << 0.5), the engagement has no effect on the disease propagation, and we have an endemic phase, which can be interpreted as a negative effect of the social pressure on the disease spreading. However, even for D < 0.5 a sufficient high engagement can lead to the disease extinction in the stationary state, since the initial majority of anti-vaccine individuals is not much larger than the initial minority of pro-vaccince agents. These results can be seen as a kind of power of the minority in the long-time limit. All these those results are realistic features of our model.
As discussed in [41] the variation of the epidemic threshold as a result of immunization has important practical consequences. In our case, for φ = 0 (temporary immunity), one can see in Figure 3 (c) that near the engagement threshold γ * a small effort to increase the engagement of pro-vaccine individuals leads the system to a disease-free phase, or even to the absence of an endemic phase (i.e., there is no endemic phase even for λ = 1.0). It means that in a given population where the initial majority supports the vaccination campaign (D > 0.5), the focus of the government should be to promote a higher engagement of such initial majority. This conclusion corroborates the discussion in [47] , that indicates that in general the better strategy in a vaccination campaign is not to direct "battle" with antivaccine individuals. On the other hand, for D < 0.5 our results suggest that the increase of engagement should not be sufficient to eliminate the disease. In this case, the more efficient strategy is to change the initial conditions, i.e., to convincing more floaters prior to the beginning of the public debate, as discussed by Galam in [25] . Finally, for φ = 0.0 (permanent immunity), the Galam's strategy [25] could present evident or neglibible results, depending on the initial fraction of pro-vaccine agents and on their engagement.
As extensions of this work, one can simulate the model on complex topologies (small world, scale free) in order to analyze the impact of the neighborhood in the dynamics presented here in the fully-connected case.
Short time
The condition for the epidemic threshold can be obtained from Eq. (2) 
Comparing the last expression with Eq. (4), we have R e = (1 − γ D)S o λ/α, that is Eq. (5) of the text. The steady state of the opinion dynamics is f +1 = 0 and f −1 = 1 [36, 37] , i.e., all agents are Pro-vaccine after a long time. For the epidemic states, the limit t → ∞ for Eqs.
(1), (2) and (3) of the text gives uṡ
Eq. (A4) for φ = 0 gives us V ∞ = 0. From Eq. (A3) we obtain two solutions,
Considering the normalization condition, the solution V ∞ = 0 and the results (A5) and (A6), one obtains
where λ c = λ In this case, the steady state of the opinion dynamics is f +1 = 1 and f −1 = 0 [36, 37] , i.e., all agents are Anti-vaccine. For the epidemic states, the limit t → ∞ for Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) of the text gives uṡ
Eq. (A9) gives us
Considering Eqs. (A10) and (A12), one gets for φ = 0
Using the normalization condition, one obtains
Comparing this last result with the standard form I ∞ ∼ (λ − λ c ) β , one obtains λ c = λ In a similiar way as we made before, the steady-state equations are given bẏ In a similiar way as we made before, the steady-state equations are given bẏ
For γ = 0 one gets S ∞ = I ∞ = 0, and the normalization conditions gives us V ∞ = 1.
